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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
---------- 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Defendant, a disbarred lawyer, was convicted of mail fraud 
by virtue of his unauthorized practice of law.  The gross amount 
of fees he received from his clients was used to calculate the 
loss caused by his fraud, and in turn, the sentence to be imposed 
under the guidelines.  With some reluctance because of the 
conduct involved, we conclude and agree with defendant's 
contention that fees paid by those who received satisfactory 
services are not to be included in determining the measurement of 
loss from his fraudulent scheme.  In addition, we remand to the 
district court for factual findings as to whether defendant's 
self-professed dissatisfied clients suffered actual financial 
loss as a result of his scheme, and if so, in what amount. 
 Because defendant utilized his special skills as an attorney 
in procuring clients, we conclude that imposing a two-point 
upward adjustment for using a special skill in the commission of 
the offense was warranted. 
 Finally, we vacate and remand with respect to the 
restitution imposed for the reasons hereinafter set forth.   
 After pleading guilty to mail fraud and credit card fraud, 
defendant was sentenced pursuant to the Federal Sentencing 
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Guidelines to two concurrent prison terms of thirty-six months 
each, to be followed by three years of supervised release.  In 
addition, he was ordered to pay $25,000 in restitution on each 
charge.  The issues presented for review are threefold: 1) 
whether the district court properly calculated the amount of loss 
caused by defendant's mail fraud for purposes of guideline § 
2F1.1; 2) whether the district court erred in imposing a two-
point upward adjustment to defendant's base offense level on the 
ground that he abused a position of trust and/or used a special 
skill to significantly facilitate the commission or concealment 
of either offense; and 3) whether the district court erred in 
ordering defendant to pay $50,000 restitution ($25,000 on each 
count).  We will affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand in 
part to the district court for further findings of fact. 
I. 
A. Mail Fraud 
 Arthur Maurello was admitted to the New Jersey State Bar in 
1976.  From 1976 to 1990, he practiced as a licensed solo 
practitioner.  In 1988, however, an ethics complaint was filed 
against him.  The Disciplinary Review Board conducted an 
investigation and found that Mr. Maurello had, among other 
things, fraudulently obtained credit cards in the name of his 
former wife and tampered with a witness in the course of the 
ethics investigation.  In re Maurello, 121 N.J. 466, 478-79 
(1990).  As a result, on October 26, 1990, Mr. Maurello was 
permanently disbarred by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Id. 
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 In 1989, apparently in anticipation of his possible 
disbarment, defendant took steps to set up a law practice under 
an assumed name.  From the New Jersey Lawyer's Diary, defendant 
selected the names of two members of the New Jersey Bar who no 
longer practiced law: Robert Burdette and Alan Jeffrey Miller. 
Although the facts are not clear from the record, it appears that 
defendant acquired personal information about Burdette by "simple 
inquiry to the Bar," and about Miller by calling a toll-free 
information line provided to the public by the California Bar. 
Defendant used this information to obtain driver's licenses, 
credit cards and social security cards under the assumed names.   
 In 1989, defendant briefly established a law practice 
entitled "Bell and Burdette."  It is unclear whether or to what 
extent he actually practiced under this name.  He then 
reactivated Miller's license to practice law, establishing a law 
firm under the name "Alan Jeffrey Miller Chartered" in 1990.  He 
hired staff and associates, and provided legal services to 
hundreds of clients.   
B. Credit Card Fraud 
 From 1988 until December 1991, defendant engaged in a scheme 
to commit credit card fraud.  Drawing on biographical information 
gleaned from obituaries, he obtained birth certificates, death 
certificates, and other information on at least twelve different 
individuals3 from public records.  He then ran credit checks and 
                                                           
3The Presentence Investigation Report alleges that appellant 
obtained credit cards in the names of approximately twenty-eight 
different people.  Appellant contends that the correct number is 
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obtained driver's licenses under the assumed names.  Finally, he 
applied for and received credit cards, on which he charged 
approximately $230,000 worth of merchandise. 
II. 
 In 1994, a U.S. Postal Inspector filed a criminal complaint 
in the District of New Jersey which charged that defendant 
committed mail fraud in connection with his unauthorized law 
practice. Defendant waived indictment in open court, and a six-
count Information was filed against him.  The Information charged 
defendant with five counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1342 and one count of credit card fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029 and 1022. 
 Defendant pled guilty to Count 1 (mail fraud) and Count 6 
(credit card fraud).  The district court sentenced him as stated 
above.   
III. Jurisdiction 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and 18 U.S.C. 3742. 
IV. Standard of Review 
 Our review of the district court's interpretation of "loss" 
for purposes of § 2F1.1 is plenary.  United States v. Badaracco, 
954 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1992).  
 The appropriate standard of review of a district court's 
decision regarding the applicability of an adjustment under the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
twelve.  The court accepted the lower number for sentencing 
purposes. 
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Guidelines "depends on the mixture of fact and law necessary to 
that court's determination."  United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 
1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 1990).  If the decision is "essentially 
factual," we apply a clearly erroneous standard.  Id.  If the 
claimed error is legal, however, we review the district court's 
decision de novo.  Id.   
 We review a district court's restitution order under a 
bifurcated standard: plenary review as to whether restitution is 
permitted by law, and abuse of discretion as to the 
appropriateness of the particular award.  United States v. 
Hunter, 52 F.3d 489, 492 (3d Cir. 1995).  
 IV. Discussion 
A. Loss Calculation on Mail Fraud Count 
 Defendant was sentenced pursuant to § 2F1.1 of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, which governs sentencing for fraud.  Under 
that guideline, the offense level for sentencing purposes is 
based in part on the amount of "loss" due to the fraud, with 
higher losses resulting in higher sentences.  The issue here is 
whether money paid by clients for apparently satisfactory legal 
services performed by an unlicensed attorney is considered part 
of the "loss" from the attorney's fraudulent acts for purposes of 
§ 2F1.1. 
 The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") took the 
position that only fees paid by dissatisfied clients should be 
considered in calculating loss.  To compute the monetary loss 
from the mail fraud, the probation office sent letters to all 
known clients of defendant's unauthorized practice, inquiring 
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whether they considered themselves victims or believed themselves 
entitled to restitution.  From approximately 225 letters, the 
probation office received ninety-seven responses.  Seventy of 
those who responded expressed satisfaction with defendant's 
services, while twenty-seven stated that they were dissatisfied 
with the legal services they received and requested their money 
back.  The fees paid by those twenty-seven persons totalled 
approximately $62,000.  The probation office recommended that 
figure to the court as the total loss from defendant's unlicensed 
practice.  
 At the sentencing hearing, both sides challenged the PSR's 
loss computation.  Defendant argued that loss should be zero, 
because his clients received the legal services for which they 
paid.  The government, on the other hand, argued that the loss 
should include the gross total of all fees paid to defendant 
during the period of his illegitimate practice, on the theory 
that none of defendant's clients received that for which they had 
paid: the services of a licensed attorney.   
 The district court accepted the government's argument, 
reasoning that "[n]o client would have paid any money had he or 
she known the defendant assumed the identity of another person, 
did not have a license to practice law."  App. 598.  The court 
concluded that since all of the clients "paid . . . the defendant 
for something the defendant could never provide . . . , every 
dollar that they paid was a loss."  Id.   Adding together all of 
the fees received by the firm, less those fees paid to 
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defendant's partner, the court calculated the total loss from 
defendant's mail fraud scheme to be $428,902. 
1. 
 In determining the way in which loss should properly be 
measured in this case, we look first to the Guidelines and 
Commentary thereto.  The Commentary to § 2F1.1 defines loss as 
"the value of the money, property, or services unlawfully taken." 
Commentary, App. Note 7.  The loss calculation need not be 
precise; the guidelines require only a "reasonable estimate" 
based on the information available.  Id. at Note 8.   
This estimate, for example, may be based on the 
approximate number of victims and an estimate of the 
average loss to each victim, or on more general 
factors, such as the nature and duration of the fraud 
and the revenues generated by similar operations.  The 
offender's gain from committing the fraud is an 
alternative estimate that ordinarily will underestimate 
the loss. 
 
Id.    
 The Commentary to § 2F1.1 then refers the reader to the 
Commentary to § 2B1.1 for a fuller discussion of loss valuation. 
Section 2B1.1 is the guideline for larceny, embezzlement, and 
theft.  The Commentary to § 2B1.1 emphasizes the amount taken 
from the victims as the primary measure of loss: "The value of 
the property stolen plays an important role in determining 
sentences for theft and other offenses involving stolen property 
because it is an indicator of both the harm to the victim and the 
gain to the defendant."  § 2B1.1, Background, ¶ 1.   
 Although the fraud guideline's cross-reference to the theft 
guideline suggests that the same measurement of loss--amount 
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taken--should be used in both cases, this court has "decline[d] 
to impose an identical [loss valuation] analysis for theft and 
fraud crimes in all cases."  United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 
529 (3d Cir. 1991).  Because our analysis in Kopp is crucial to 
an understanding of subsequent Third Circuit case law, we will 
discuss it in some detail.   
 At the outset, we looked to the legislative purpose behind 
the guidelines.  We reasoned that  
[m]echanical application of the theft guideline in 
fraud cases would frustrate the legislative purpose of 
the guidelines and contravene the specific language of 
the Commission.  The sentencing guideline system was 
designed to sentence similarly situated defendants 
similarly; basing all fraud sentences on a simple 
'amount taken' rule without regard to actual or 
intended harm would contravene that purpose. 
   
Id. (emphasis added).  It is important to note that, while 
'amount taken' and 'actual harm' are often the same thing, there 
are circumstances in which the amount taken from the victims 
understates or overstates the actual harm done--for example, when 
the perpetrator returns to the victims all or part of that which 
was actually taken from them, thus reducing their actual loss 
without altering the amount originally taken.  Because the 
potential for amount taken to misstate loss is greater in fraud 
cases, which are generally not based on a straightforward taking 
of property, we concluded our legislative purpose analysis by 
stating that "we think it plain that actual harm is generally 
relevant to the proper sentence" for fraud.  Id.    
 Next, we stated that "a detailed analysis of the entire 
fraud guideline Commentary" supports our conclusion.  Id.   We 
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reasoned that the language of the cross-reference itself "does 
not say that the definitions of 'loss' for theft and fraud crimes 
are identical, just that '[v]aluation of loss is discussed in the 
Commentary to §2B1.1 . . . .'"  Id.  Whereas the theft guideline 
simply makes amount taken from the victim the preferred measure 
of loss, we noted that the fraud guideline requires a "slightly . 
. . more complicated" analysis: (1) actual loss is the baseline 
measure for fraud, but (2) if either "probable" or "intended" 
loss is reasonably calculable and higher than actual loss, then 
it should be used instead.  Id. (citing Commentary to § 2F1.1, 
App. Note 7).4  We therefore concluded that (1) the fraud 
guideline defines loss primarily as "the amount of money the 
victim has actually lost (estimated at the time of sentencing), 
not the potential loss as measured at the time of the crime," 
Kopp, 951 F.2d at 536 (emphasis added); and (2) "the 'loss' 
should be revised upward to the loss that the defendant intended 
to inflict, if that amount is higher than actual loss."  Id.    
 We noted that this conclusion was "essentially consistent" 
with the fraud guideline's cross-reference to the theft guideline 
with respect to loss valuation.  951 F.2d at 529.  We reasoned 
that "[i]n both theft and fraud cases, the guideline 'loss' turns 
out to be the higher of the actual loss and the intended loss."  
Id.   
                                                           
4The current version of Application Note 7 does not mention 
"probable" loss.  It reads as follows: "Consistent with the 
provisions of § 2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation or Conspiracy), if 
an intended loss that the defendant was attempting to inflict can 
be determined, this figure will be used if it is greater than the 
actual loss." 
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 We acknowledged, however, that "our reconciliation of 
U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1 and 2F1.1 might fail" in the case of 
embezzlement.  951 F.2d 530 n.13.   
 
Conceivably, an embezzler might secret away $10,000 in 
office funds to invest in a reputable stock, truly 
intending and hoping to return the amount taken (plus 
interest) after selling the stock.  Under a literal 
reading of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, "loss" is the "amount 
taken," $10,000 in our example.  In that case intended 
loss would be zero, and actual loss might also be zero. 
But if U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 applied (it would not), under 
our interpretation "loss" would be zero, and no 
sentence enhancement would apply.   
 
951 F.2d at 530 n.13.  To address this potential inconsistency, 
we suggested that "embezzlement, unlike ordinary theft or fraud, 
involves not only a taking but also an action akin to a breach of 
fiduciary duty, which might justify always using the amount taken 
as 'loss.'"  Id.   
 This language formed the basis of our holding the following 
year in United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1992). 
In Badaracco, we revisited the issue of loss valuation under the 
fraud guidelines and restricted the scope of Kopp.  Badaracco 
involved the president and CEO of a bank who had approved loans 
to certain developers on the condition that they award electrical 
subcontracts to companies in which he had an interest.  The 
district court, ruling prior to our decision in Kopp, computed 
loss for purposes of § 2F1.1 by adding together the face values 
of the fraudulently induced contracts.   
 During the pendency of the appeal, Kopp was issued.  We 
ruled in Badaracco, however, that Kopp did not require us to 
12 
compute loss on the basis of actual loss in that case.  
Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 937.  Restricting the scope of the rule 
articulated in Kopp, we stated that "the sentencing judge is 
entitled, probably compelled, to evaluate the size of the loss 
based on the particular offense." Id.  Then, relying on the dicta 
in Kopp regarding embezzlement, we held that "[w]hen the officer 
of a financial institution uses his or her position for personal 
benefit, there is a breach of fiduciary duty comparable to that 
implicated by embezzlement, which may justify using the 'gross 
gain' alternative to estimate 'loss.'" Id. at 938.  We concluded 
that gross gain was the appropriate measure of loss in Badaracco.  
Id. at 938. 
 Since defendant's fraud in this case involved a breach of 
fiduciary duty, the government contends that Badaracco governs 
and therefore that the appropriate measure of loss is defendant's 
"gross gain."  Appellee's Br. at 22.  We disagree, for two 
reasons. 
 First, the government's interpretation of Badaracco sweeps 
far too broadly.  As discussed above, we did not hold that gross 
gain is the measure to apply in every fraud case involving a 
breach of fiduciary duty; rather, we held that "a breach of 
fiduciary duty comparable to that implicated by embezzlement . . 
. may justify using the 'gross gain' alternative to estimate 
'loss.'"  Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 938.  Defendant's mail fraud 
scheme is not sufficiently analogous to embezzlement to justify 
using gross gain as the measure of loss.  In embezzlement, breach 
of fiduciary duty is an inherent element of the crime.  Kopp, 951 
13 
F.2d at 530 n.13. Similarly, in the bank fraud provision 
underlying Badaracco, as written and as applied in that case, 
breach of fiduciary duty is implicitly an element.5  Under both 
crimes, the defendant has rightful possession of or control over 
money, which he fraudulently diverts to his own purposes by 
breaching his fiduciary responsibility to the money's rightful 
owner.   
 In this case, however, defendant was charged with mail fraud 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1341.  The gravamen of his offense is the 
use of the mails to further a fraudulent purpose.  Defendant did 
not fraudulently convert money over which he had possession or 
control; rather, he fraudulently induced people to enter into 
contracts pursuant to which they gave him money in exchange for 
services.  The mere fact that defendant's scheme involved a 
breach of fiduciary duty does not bring it under the penumbra of 
Badaracco.    
 Second, even if we agreed with the government's analogy, we 
would reject their argument that "gross gain" to the defendant is 
the appropriate measure of loss under Badaracco because the 
portion of the fraud guideline on which that holding was based 
                                                           
518 U.S.C. § 1006, excerpted in Badaracco, provides as follows: 
Whoever, being an officer . . . [of] any lending, 
mortgage, insurance, credit or savings and loan 
corporation or association authorized or acting under 
the laws of the United States . . . with intent to 
defraud any such institution . . . participates or 
shares in or receives directly or indirectly any money, 
profit, property, or benefits through any transaction, 
loan commission, contract, or any other act of any such 
corporation, institution, or association, shall be 
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 
five years, or both. 
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has been amended.  In Badaracco, we held that the analogy to 
embezzlement justified our "using the 'gross gain' alternative to 
estimate 'loss,' expressly authorized in Application Note 8."  
Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 938.  In 1991, however, Application Note 8 
was amended, deleting "offender's gross gain" and substituting 
"offender's gain."  See § 2F1.1, Note 8.  We noted this change in 
Badaracco, but stated that "[b]ecause we do not remand on this 
issue, we need not consider the effect of this change in 
subsequent sentencings." Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 938 n.11.  
Defendant in this case was sentenced on January 31, 1995--nearly 
four years after this amendment took effect.  Although we do not 
need to reach this issue in this case, it seems clear that the 
guidelines no longer endorse "gross gain" to the defendant as an 
alternative measure of loss. 
 As a result, pursuant to the mandate of the guidelines and 
the reasoning of our decision in Kopp, we conclude that actual 
loss is the appropriate basis for loss measurement in this case. 
2. 
 We now turn to the task of determining the appropriate 
measurement of actual loss under the facts of this case.  The 
government contends, and the district court found, that every 
dollar paid to defendant during his illegitimate practice was a 
dollar lost, because "the true market value of the services 
provided by defendant Maurello was zero."  Appellee's Br. at 19. 
The government asserts that "[l]egal representation by a non-
lawyer is worth nothing in the marketplace; it is a commodity 
that cannot be sold, as a matter of law."  Id.   
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 This argument ignores reality.  A client who obtains a 
satisfactory contract, settlement, or verdict has received 
something of value, irrespective of whether the lawyer was 
licensed at the time.  The services rendered do not become 
worthless if the client later learns that the attorney was not 
licensed to practice when the services were performed.  If the 
validity of the services could later be attacked on the ground 
that they were performed by an attorney who had been disbarred, 
then the government's argument might have merit; however, there 
is no such allegation in this case. 
 Furthermore, the government's argument contravenes the 
clearly expressed policy of the guidelines.  Congress instructed 
the Sentencing Commission to take the "nature and degree of the 
harm caused by the offense" into account in drafting the 
guidelines.  28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(3).  Thus, the policy statement 
at the opening of the guideline manual states that the guidelines 
are designed to serve two sentencing purposes: "just deserts" and 
"crime control." Guidelines Ch. 1, Part A, § 3.  Under the theory 
of just deserts, according to the policy statement, "punishment 
should be scaled to the offender's culpability and the resulting 
harms."  Id. 
 More importantly for our purposes, section 1B1.3, entitled 
"Relevant Conduct," states that "specific offense 
characteristics" shall be determined on the basis of, inter alia,  
"all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions . . . [of the 
defendant], and all harm that was the object of such acts and 
omissions."  §1B1.3(a)(3).  Section 2F1.1 clearly designates the 
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amount of loss from fraud as a specific offense characteristic.  
§ 2F1.1(b)(1); see also § 2B1.1(b)(1)(designating amount of loss 
from theft as a specific offense characteristic).  It follows 
that the degree of harm caused by defendant's acts is relevant to 
the determination of loss.  See also Commentary to § 2B1.1, 
Background ¶ 1 ("The value of the property stolen plays an 
important role in determining sentences . . . because it is an 
indicator of both the harm to the victim and the gain to the 
defendant."); id. at application note 2 ("Where the market value 
is difficult to ascertain or inadequate to measure harm to the 
victim, the court may measure loss in some other way, such as 
reasonable replacement cost to the victim.")(emphasis added). 
 The district court in this case rejected actual harm to the 
victims as a means of measuring loss on the ground that such an 
approach would put the court  
in the anomalous position of slapping the wrist of the 
competent malefactor and harshly sanctioning the 
incompetent one when both are equally culpable because 
the crime lies in the fact of their misrepresentation, 
not the nature and quality of the representation of 
their clients.  
 
App. 59.  The court concluded that "assessing the quality of the 
services offered by the unlicensed attorney . . . is not the 
purpose of the calculation for determining amount of loss."  Id. 
at 609.    
 For the reasons just stated, we believe this argument 
misconstrues the theory of the guidelines and the nature and 
purpose of the loss measurement.  The quality of services 
rendered is directly relevant to the degree of harm caused by 
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defendant's actions.  Under the theory advanced by the district 
court, an unlicensed attorney who represents 100 people, earning 
$200,000 in fees and obtaining spectacular results for all of 
them, would receive the same punishment as one who represents the 
same number of clients incompetently and to their detriment but 
receives the same amount in fees.  A theory that yields such a 
perverse result is "simple, but irrational."  Kopp, 951 F.2d at 
532.  We simply cannot agree with the district court's assertion 
that two defendants so situated are "equally culpable."   
 We wish to make clear that we are neither rewarding nor 
condoning the unauthorized practice of law.  The issue here is 
not whether or not defendant will be punished for his conduct, 
but rather whether his base offense level will be enhanced on 
account of loss caused by his fraud.  To the extent that the 
unauthorized services provided by defendant have not harmed their 
recipients, but to the contrary have benefitted them, we conclude 
that defendant's base offense level should not be enhanced.  A 
person who hires a contractor to construct a building according 
to certain specifications, for example, and receives a flawless 
and structurally sound building as a result of the bargain, 
cannot be said to have suffered a loss simply because he later 
learns that the contractor was not licensed at the time of 
construction.  In those circumstances, the victim has sustained 
no loss because he has received the services for which he 
bargained, despite the fact that he has received them from a 
person who was not legally authorized to offer them.  For 
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defendant's conduct in practicing without a license he should be 
and has been punished. 
 The Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. 
Schneider, 930 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1991), supports our conclusion.  
In deciding the appropriate measure of loss from fraudulently 
induced construction contracts that were terminated before the 
intended victim paid any money, Judge Posner reasoned that 
it is necessary to distinguish between two types of 
fraud.  One is where the offender--a true con artist . 
. . --does not intend to perform his undertaking, the 
contract or whatever; he means to pocket the entire 
contract price without rendering any service in return. 
In such a case the contract price is a reasonable 
estimate of what we are calling the expected loss, and 
we repeat that no more than a reasonable estimate is 
required.  The other type of fraud is committed in 
order to obtain a contract that the defendant might 
otherwise not obtain, but he means to perform the 
contract (and is able to do so) and to pocket, as the 
profit from the fraud, only the difference between the 
contract price and his costs. 
 
Id. at 558.  Stating that the estimate of loss pursuant to § 
2F1.1 must bear some relation to "economic reality," id. at 559, 
the Seventh Circuit ruled that the fraud committed in Schneider 
was of the latter type.  Because there was no reason to believe 
that the defendants would not have performed the contracts "to 
the perfect satisfaction of the contracting agency," the court 
rejected gross gain to the defendants as the appropriate measure 
of loss.  Id. at 558.  We endorsed this reasoning in Kopp, and we 
do so again today. 
3. 
    The government argues in the alternative that the loss from 
defendant's fraud should be measured in terms of the total money 
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paid to defendant because that money "was diverted from 
defendant's legitimate competitors."  We reject this argument for 
the same reason we rejected the district court's measurement of 
actual loss: it eliminates any meaningful correlation between 
severity of punishment and degree of harm caused, and it measures 
the loss to those who are not direct victims of the defendant's 
conduct.  For every fraud in the sale of goods or services, there 
is someone who could have sold the same goods or delivered the 
same services as promised or represented, but they are but 
distant and remote victims of such fraudulent conduct.  It is not 
their loss which should provide the measure, but rather the 
direct victims of defendant's conduct.  Every person who commits 
the type of fraud for which defendant stands convicted can be 
said to have diverted money from legitimate competitors.  Thus, 
under this theory, the measure of loss in this type of case would 
always be equal to the total fees paid to defendant, regardless 
of the actual harm to the victims.  This would render the degree 
of harm caused by a defendant's acts irrelevant to Guideline 
sentencing--a result that is contrary to the policy of the 
Guidelines as discussed above. 
4.      
 Having rejected the measure of fraud loss employed by the 
district court, we must determine an appropriate substitute.  For 
purposes of § 2F1.1, "the loss need not be determined with 
precision.  The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the 
loss, given the available information."  Commentary to § 2F1.1, 
App. Note 8.   
20 
 We take as our starting place the probation office's 
proposal that actual harm be measured by the total amount of fees 
paid by dissatisfied clients.  Because this method seeks to 
identify those clients who were actually harmed by defendant's 
actions, it is a good starting place for measuring loss.  It does 
not provide a "reasonable estimate" standing alone, however, 
because unsubstantiated complaints voiced by clients only after 
they have learned of defendant's wrongdoing and their possible 
right to restitution are unreliable at best, and inherently 
suspect.  In order to render the probation office's estimate a 
reasonable one for purposes of § 2F1.1, we hold that the 
government must demonstrate and the district court must find that 
the complaints on which it is based are bona fide and can 
reasonably support a loss determination.  We therefore remand to 
the district court for the purpose of determining whether the 
twenty-seven complaints underlying the probation office's loss 
estimate bear a reasonable relationship to actual or intended 
loss.  The district court is not required to determine whether 
each complainant has a grievance that could support a malpractice 
determination, but merely whether the complainant's claimed loss 
has a reasonable basis in fact so that the court is convinced 
that the complainant did not respond to the government's inquiry 
merely in the hope of procuring a financial windfall. 
 Our conclusion that the district court overvalued fraud loss 
under the circumstances is by no means an indication that the 
district court overestimated the seriousness of the underlying 
conduct.  Section 2F1.1 provides that "[i]n cases in which the 
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loss determined under subsection (b)(1) does not fully capture 
the harmfulness and seriousness of the conduct, an upward 
departure may be warranted."  § 2F1.1.  In this case, as in Kopp, 
the district court is free to reconsider on remand "whether the 
properly calculated 'loss' significantly over- or understates the 
gravity of the crime, and therefore whether departure from the 
normal sentencing range is appropriate."  Kopp, 951 F.2d at 536.   
B. Abuse of a Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill 
 The district court imposed a two-point upward adjustment 
pursuant to § 3B1.3 for abuse of a position of trust or use of a 
special skill.  Section 3B1.3 provides: "If the defendant abused 
a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, 
in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or 
concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels."  § 3B1.3.  The 
district court found that defendant had abused a position of 
trust in connection with the mail fraud, and that he had used a 
special skill in the commission of both the mail fraud and the 
credit card fraud.   As either abuse of a position of trust or 
use of a special skill standing alone is a sufficient basis for 
an upward adjustment, we must uphold the district court's 
determination if any one of these three grounds was proper. 
1. Use of a Special Skill  
 We begin by addressing the district court's finding that 
defendant used a special skill in the commission of both 
offenses. The Commentary to § 3B1.3 describes the enhancement for 
use of a special skill in the commission of an offense as 
follows: 
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"Special skill" refers to a skill not possessed by 
members of the general public and usually requiring 
substantial education, training or licensing.  Examples 
would include pilots, lawyers, doctors, accountants, 
chemists, and demolition experts.  
 
Application Note 2.  Like the enhancement for abuse of a position 
of trust, this adjustment "applies to persons who abuse . . . 
their special skills to facilitate significantly the commission 
or concealment of a crime."  Background to § 3B1.3.   
a. Mail Fraud 
i. 
 To impose an upward adjustment for use of a special skill 
pursuant to § 3B1.3, a court must find two things: (1) that 
defendant possesses a special skill; and (2) that he used it to 
significantly facilitate the commission or concealment of his 
offense.  United States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d 1110, 1112 (3d Cir. 
1993).  In this case, the district court neither made specific 
findings of fact nor articulated reasons in support of its 
conclusion that defendant used a special skill in perpetrating 
the mail fraud scheme.  As a result, we must determine whether 
the record as a whole "demonstrates" the manner in which 
defendant used his special skill to facilitate the commission or 
concealment of the offense.  United States v. Rice, 52 F.3d 843, 
850 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Gandy, 36 F.3d 912, 916 
(10th Cir. 1994). If the record as a whole supports the district 
court's enhancement of defendant's sentence for use of a special 
skill in the commission of the mail fraud offense, then we need 
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not remand for specific factual findings in support of the 
enhancement.  Id.   
 We begin with the first prong of the § 3B1.3 inquiry: 
whether defendant possesses a special skill within the meaning of 
the guideline.  The court appears to have found that defendant's 
"special skill is [not] the practice of law per se, but rather is 
the knowledge that one obtains through a legal education and 
prior practice."  App. 580; see also Govt's Br. at 44 ("[T]he 
special skill adjustment rested on the whole panoply of practical 
skills associated with a legal career.").  We note at the outset 
that defendant's legal training clearly constitutes a special 
skill, as lawyering is specifically listed as an example of a 
special skill in the text of the Guideline.  Moreover, under the 
circumstances, we believe that including defendant's experiences 
and general knowledge acquired over the course of his legal 
career within the contours of his special skill is warranted.  
See United States v. Culver, 929 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1991)(finding 
use of special skill where pilot convicted of conspiracy to 
transport stolen aircraft had used his skills to plan for fuel 
and devise flight plans, despite arrest before take-off); United 
States v. White, 972 F.2d 590, 600-01, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
1651 (1993), cert. denied sub nom Wilson v. United States, id. 
(finding use of special skill where defense attorney specializing 
in drug cases used knowledge acquired as a prosecutor and defense 
lawyer to avoid surveillance during drug conspiracy activities).   
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 The district court's decision with respect to the second 
part of the inquiry--whether defendant used his special skill to 
significantly facilitate the mail fraud--is a question of fact 
that we review for clear error.  The factual basis of the 
district court's finding is not clear from the record.  The 
government's argument, which presumably the court adopted, is 
that defendant "used his special legal skills" in "ascertaining 
the names of inactive lawyers or obtaining their credit histories 
for the purpose of assuming their identities."  Govt. Br. at 38.  
According to the government's Sentencing Memorandum, which was 
part of the record at the time of sentencing, the defendant's  
education and experiences as a licensed attorney 
enabled him to successfully portray himself to his 
clients, adversaries, and the courts as a knowledgeable 
attorney. By using these skills, he was able to conceal 
the truth about his identity and his unlicensed status 
and enabled him [sic] to dupe more people into hiring 
him under the false impression that he was licensed to 
practice law. In short, he used his previous 
experience, education, and training to perpetuate the 
fraud and to conceal it. 
 
App. 548.   
 We note that this case presents a rather unique situation 
insofar as the very use of the special skill (legal competence) 
mitigated the severity of the offense by avoiding harm to 
victims. Nevertheless, the fact remains that defendant was an 
experienced lawyer with experience in setting up a law practice 
and soliciting clients, that these skills are not possessed by 
the general public, and that he used these skills to facilitate 
his fraudulent scheme and to avoid detection.  The district 
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court's decision to adjust defendant's sentence upwardly for use 
of a special skill was not clearly erroneous.  
ii. 
 Defendant argues that enhancing his sentence for use of a 
special skill pursuant to § 3B1.3 while also imposing an upward 
adjustment under § 2F1.1(b)(3)(B) constitutes impermissible 
double counting.  Guideline § 2F1.1(b)(3)(B) provides for a two-
level increase in offense level if the offense involved 
"violation of any judicial or administrative order."  Id.  Since 
defendant's unlicensed practice was a direct violation of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court order of disbarment, the district court 
enhanced his sentence pursuant to § 2F1.1(b)(3)(B).  Defendant 
apparently does not challenge this enhancement, but rather uses 
it as the basis for his challenge to the § 3B1.3 adjustment for 
use of a special skill in connection with his mail fraud scheme.  
The theory behind his argument is that both enhancements punish 
the same behavior: the practice of law.   
 In United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667 (3d Cir. 1993), we 
addressed the issue of double counting under the guidelines. 
Defendant in that case challenged the simultaneous imposition of 
upward adjustments for more than minimal planning under 
§2B1.1(b)(5) and for acting as an organizer or leader of a 
criminal enterprise under § 3B1.1(c).  We reasoned that "because 
the Guidelines are explicit when two Sentencing Guideline 
sections may not be applied at the same time, the principle of 
statutory construction, 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' 
applies." Id. at 670-71.  We concluded that "an adjustment that 
26 
clearly applies to the conduct of an offense must be imposed 
unless the Guidelines exclude its applicability."  Id. at 671.   
 That reasoning applies with equal force here.  Nothing in 
the Guidelines indicates that § 3B1.3 and § 2F1.1(b)(3)(B) may 
not be applied in tandem.  We therefore reject defendant's double 
counting argument. 
 We note that even in the absence of governing legal 
precedent, we would reject defendant's argument on purely logical 
grounds. Contrary to his assertions, the enhancements under § 
2F1.1(b)(3)(B) and § 3B1.3 do not "dr[a]w from the same well."  
United States v. Kopshever, 6 F.3d 1218, 1224 (7th Cir. 1993).  
On the contrary, neither one punishes the practice of law per se.  
The former punishes defendant's flagrant violation of a judicial 
order; the latter, his use of the panoply of skills associated 
with legal practice to facilitate passing himself off as a 
licensed attorney. "[E]ven if there is some overlap in the 
factual basis for two or more sentencing adjustments, so long as 
there is sufficient factual basis for each they may both be 
applied."  United States v. Haines, 32 F.3d 290, 293-93 (7th Cir. 
1994).  Despite the slight overlap between these two provisions 
as applied in this case, they target different behavior.  As a 
result, even if the law forbade double counting in the absence of 
explicit instructions in the guidelines, the simultaneous 
application of these two enhancement provisions would not 
constitute double counting. 
iii. 
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 Because we have concluded that the district court properly 
imposed a two-point upward adjustment for use of a special skill 
in the commission of the mail fraud offense, we need not and do 
not reach the issues of whether defendant used a special skill in 
the commission of the credit card fraud or abused a position of 
trust within the meaning of the guidelines.  
C. Restitution 
 Under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, which is 
incorporated into the Guidelines by § 5E1.1, a district court 
sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under Title 18 
"may order . . . that the defendant make restitution to any 
victim of such offense."  18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1).  In determining 
whether to order restitution and setting the amount, the court  
shall consider the amount of the loss sustained by any 
victim as a result of the offense, the financial 
resources of the defendant, the financial needs and 
earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's 
dependents, and such other factors as the court deems 
appropriate. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3664(a).  In this circuit, the sentencing court must 
make specific factual findings as to the amount of loss sustained 
by the victims, the defendant's ability to pay, and the 
relationship between the amount of restitution ordered and the 
loss caused by defendant's offense.  United States v. Graham, 
1995 WL 744974, *3 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Logar, 975 
F.2d 958, 961 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 In this case, the district court ordered defendant to pay 
$25,000 in restitution on the mail fraud counts and $25,000 on 
the credit card fraud count.  Counsel for both sides briefly 
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addressed the issue of defendant's resources and his ability to 
pay.  Defense counsel argued that defendant has "no resources" 
and owes $170,000 in state and federal taxes, App. 646-48, and 
expressed doubt that "restitution is actually feasible in this 
case."  App. 648.  The prosecutor then argued, without going into 
greater detail, that "the sum total that we know about the 
defendant's assets are set forth in paragraph 134 of the 
presentence report."  App. 649. Although she did not address 
restitution on the mail fraud counts, she concluded by 
acknowledging: "Obviously I don't believe there is going to be 
enough to repay all the credit card companies that suffered an 
injury . . . ."  App. 649. 
 The only factual information in the record regarding 
defendant's financial resources and ability to pay is found in 
the PSR.  The PSR lists defendant's assets as follows: a 
condominium valued at $110,000; $18,000 in a money market 
account; a few hundred dollars in a checking account; $70 in a 
savings account; and automobiles valued at $2500.  PSR ¶ 134.  
The PSR reports that defendant and his wife owe $12,800 on their 
credit cards (not including the fraudulent credit card activity).  
Id. at ¶ 135. Defendant's wife's income of $1741 per month is the 
only income to the household and is insufficient to cover their 
monthly expenses of $1992.  Id. at 136.  The PSR concludes that 
defendant "is capable of maintaining steady employment . . . 
[and] paying partial restitution."  Id. at ¶ 137.  
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 None of these factual allegations is undisputed.  Defendant 
challenged virtually all of them in his sentencing memorandum. 
Contrary to the PSR's assessment, defendant maintains that he 
has no assets.  His wife's assets are separately and 
individually held.  All purchases were made by Ms. 
Rzeczyeki and were accumulated through her own 
earnings. All assets listed except the I.R.A. are the 
defendant's wife's, not his.  Reference to these 
separate assets should be excised.  The I.R.A. was the 
property of the defendant, but was liquidated following 
the defendant's arrest and used to pay living expenses 
for the past ten (10) months.  Thus, the defendant has 
no assets. 
 
App. 54.  In addition, defendant challenges the PSR's assessment 
of his future earning potential and ability to pay: 
Mr. Maurello has no assets.  Upon release from custody, 
financial resources will remain limited.  This is 
especially true since his tax returns have been filed 
pursuant to the plea agreement, and [he] is obligated 
to pay the resulting liabilities.  He owes money to the 
Internal Revenue Service which includes tax liability, 
interest and penalties which, all totalled, are more 
than $170,000.  
 
Id. 
 "Where a defendant alleges any factual inaccuracy in the 
presentence report, the Court must make: (1) a finding as to the 
allegation, or (2) a determination that no such finding is 
necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into 
account in sentencing."  United States v. Cherry, 10 F.3d 1003, 
1013 (3d Cir. 1993).  Here, in response to this cursory and 
conflicting testimony, the court stated as follows: 
 Well, the defendant's varied and extensive crimes 
set forth in the presentence report have left a 
financial mess and a substantial amount of loss to a 
diverse variety of victims and limited resources to 
repay. 
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 I don't want to deprecate the loss of the 
defendant's in any way.  On the other hand, I don't 
want to set an amount of restitution which is unlikely 
to ever be repaid.  This is a very difficult 
undertaking. 
 We know who is to get the money.  What we don't 
know is how much to order that they be given.  The 
amount of loss is substantial, as we know.  The 
defendant is never going to pay back a good portion of 
it. 
 Without derogating in any way any efforts that the 
victims may take on their own to collect, I will limit 
restitution to $50,000 . . . on each count in lieu of 
any fine. 
 
App. 650.   
 It is apparent from this excerpt that the district court 
failed to make the findings of fact required by our decisions in 
Cherry and Logar.  First, the court made no finding regarding 
defendant's ability to pay.  While the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act provides that "[t]he burden of demonstrating the 
financial resources of the defendant and the financial needs of 
the defendant's dependents shall be on the defendant," 18 U.S.C. 
§3664(d), the court cannot impose restitution without making 
specific findings of fact in this regard.  Defendant asserts (1) 
that he owes $170,000 in back taxes, (2) that those taxes are 
subject to collection by levy upon his wages, (3) that he has 
never earned more than $25,000 per year in any job, and (4) that 
the most he will take home following deduction of back taxes by 
the IRS is $161.54 per week.  Appellant's Br. at 37-38.  If these 
assertions are correct, then defendant will not even earn $50,000 
over the course of three years, much less be able to pay that 
amount in restitution.   The court's only mention of defendant's 
ability to pay was the pro forma statement that "I don't mean to 
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deprecate the defendant's crimes by setting the amount of 
$50,000, but merely to try to, as the Guidelines tell us, try to 
equate the restitution obligation with the defendant's ability to 
pay as he may be able to obtain monies in the future."  App. 651.   
 Moreover, the district court failed to make an express 
factual finding in the restitution context regarding the 
relationship between the claimed losses to victims and 
defendant's offense conduct.  It may be the case that the 
district court relied on its earlier finding in the fraud loss 
context that all clients were victims and all fees paid were 
losses.  Because these losses would not necessarily be subject to 
restitution, however, the district court erred in not making a 
specific finding for purposes of restitution.  More importantly, 
even if the court had made a specific finding that all fees paid 
to defendant were losses related to his offense, that finding 
would be clearly erroneous in light of our holding in Part VA of 
this opinion.  As discussed above, insofar as defendant's clients 
were satisfied with his services, the fees that they paid in 
exchange for those services cannot be considered losses.   
 While the district court's award of restitution on the 
credit card fraud count is somewhat less problematic, insofar as 
the victims of that fraud and the amount that each is owed is 
clearly established, the district court's failure to make a 
specific finding as to defendant's ability to pay requires remand 
on this issue as well.  
 We therefore remand to the district court for factual 
findings in support of the restitution order.  This is especially 
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appropriate in light of our ruling today that the appropriate 
measure of loss was not the total of all fees paid to the 
illegitimate practice ($428,902), but rather the fees paid by 
those clients who were justifiably dissatisfied (approximately 
$62,000 if existing complaints are verified).  Thus, one of the 
key factors that the district court should have considered in 
setting the amount of restitution was inflated to nearly seven 
times its correct value. 
 Furthermore, we do not require that the district court make 
a separate finding as to the amount of restitution due to each 
victim.  The court may establish a formula and authorize the 
Probation Office, not the U.S. Attorney, to apply it.  The 
parties might also stipulate to the identity and amounts to be 
paid subject to court approval.  However, we specifically express 
our view that the Probation Department rather than the U.S. 
Attorney is the proper agency to carry out such functions.    
VI. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will (1) reverse the district 
court's fraud loss valuation and remand to the district court for 
factfinding and resentencing consistent with this opinion; (2) 
affirm the district court's imposition of a two-point upward 
adjustment for use of a special skill in connection with the mail 
fraud; and (3) vacate the district court's order of restitution 
and remand to the district court for appropriate factual 
findings.  
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WELLFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to 
emphasize several aspects of the case.  The amount paid by 
Maurello's fraud victims who indicated dissatisfaction with his 
services represents to this judge a good initial measure of the 
degree of "loss" involved by reason of this deceitful and 
unconscionable conduct by a disbarred lawyer.  The "value" of 
legal services is hard to gauge by laymen clients just as the 
"measure of harm" to these "clients" is difficult to assay.  It 
is also a serious challenge to ascertain to what extent 
Maurello's services may have benefitted the victims or "clients" 
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who did not complain. A qualified and licensed attorney may have 
done a better job for less money, or it may be that Maurello's 
services were actually inadequate, unknown to his "client."  Upon 
the remand, I would emphasize that the district court must only 
determine whether the dissatisfied "clients" or victims have "a 
reasonable basis in fact" for their professed feeling of having 
been shortchanged by Maurello. 
 I am disposed to concur, not altogether enthusiastically, 
with my brothers in their interpretation of United States v. 
Kopp, 951 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1991), and United States v. 
Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1992), in assessing fraud loss 
under the guidelines. I find it difficult, however, to find a 
good analogy between the services of an unlicensed contractor in 
building a structure, and the services of a disbarred lawyer in 
handling a domestic relations case.  Thus, I do not find United 
States v. Schneider, 930 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1991), particularly 
relevant. 
 I would also emphasize that the district court is "free to 
reconsider on remand" whether an upward departure is 
"appropriate" in light of all the circumstances. 
